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What does ’the beyond’ (or transcendence in general) mean in a so–called 
post–modern world? What do these concepts mean for such a world? The 
concept of transcendence or the beyond shows up in myriads of perspec-
tives and experiences, but what is its effective meaning? This also includes 
the question of its relevance as a concept (let alone the truth or rather truth-
fulness of the concept). What for instance is the purpose of man’s eschato-
logical hope towards an otherworldly paradise, a life after death, within the 
life people actually live? Or the other way round: Does our knowledge of 
the possibility of aeons (what time measurement does fit here?) even before 
the big bang occurred not lead us to the cosmological assumption of true 
otherwordlyness, especially when we realize that mankind’s being is but 
a blink of an eye on the canvas of the vast infinity of an expanding multi-
verse in relation to which we eventually will never have been? No matter 
how large a number, in comparison to infinity it is still zero. Even these two 
suppositions alone seem to indicate that the question for the beyond may 
just arise in anthropic perspective, that is within the lives and times of con-
tingent human beings. From what other perspective should it arise though? 
There surely are attempts of philosophical hermeneutics that try to be non–
anthropic,1 but even here one cannot dismiss the original motive that such 
hermeneutics can be reasonable and provide meaning for human under-
standing. So is there any way for humans to get beyond being human? Prob-
ably as consequence of the final “adieu” of one dying individual with which 
the world (not a world but the world) comes to an end — over and over, 
though once and for all?2 Or does going beyond that which is human mean 
* Thies Münchow, thiesmuenchow@gmail.com, Europa–Universität Flensburg, University 
of Flensburg
1 See for instance Welsch, Wolfgang. Homo mundanus: Jenseits der anthropischen Denkform 
der Moderne. Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2012; also Welsch, Wolfgang. Mensch und Welt: Eine 
evolutionäre Perspektive der Philosophie. München: C.H. Beck, 2012. 
2 Cf. Derrida, Jacques. Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford, CA: University Press, 1999.
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the hope of transcending oneself to become super human, übermenschlich?3 
But what would this kind of transcending be? Does it mean the evolution 
of something that potentially lies within us as human beings? An evolu-
tion though presupposes something that is already involute, so how is that 
in any way transcendent or beyond? Instead of speaking of potentiality do 
we rather have to speak of virtuality, for virtuality means an open orienta-
tion towards an indefinite future?4 This at least moves a little closer to the 
realm of true transcendence. Virtuality as an artistic concept shows itself 
as a quite fertile mode of thought to gain access to the idea of transcend-
ence or experiencing the beyond. Countless arts and art–styles of the 20th 
and 21st century show a great capability in handling the numinous or the 
unrepresentable (das Undarstellbare). Movies, music, the internet and video 
games are otherworldly romping places within the so called real world. In 
this effect the beyond seems to be a daily matter, probably all too human. 
The otherworld, the numinous, the beyond are utensils. But has this not 
been so ever since? The beyond and the transcendent (God) are useful ideas 
for human beings. But how are these concepts actually applied within the 
daily life of people? “Dear God, please make mom and dad buy me a Play-
station 4, a pony and a plastic rocket…and by the way feed those in need 
and restore peace on earth.” Do ut des. Who is addressed here if not a God 
that is supposedly capable of doing things beyond the means. But this is 
not just some playing with words. Let us consider one thing: is it not so 
that God is supposed to be der ganz Andere, transcendent — literally ab-
solute, detached? How would one address something completely beyond 
one’s comprehension? Something is either beyond, which means there is no 
option to ever address it or it simply is not beyond. So does a consequent 
concept of the beyond even make sense — epistemologically? theologically? 
Let us for instance take God or the eschatological kingdom of God. What 
concepts are we dealing with here? On the one hand Luke 17,21 speaks of 
the “kingdom of God” to be “within” us (Luther translates “Das Himmelreich 
ist mitten unter Euch”). On the other hand Jesus Christ himself experienc-
es the absence of God (Matthew 27,47; Mark 15,34) let alone his emptying 
(kenosis) (Philippians 2,7) and even speaks of his own (Philippians 2,12): 
“Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence 
only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with 
fear and trembling.” The emphasis here lies on “much more in my absence”. 
But wait, absence does not necessarily imply transcendence. Surely faith in 
3 Cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Also sprach Zarathustra. Kritische Studienausgabe. Vol. 4. Edited 
by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. München: DTV, 2007.
4 Cf. Gadamer, Hans–Georg. Der Anfang der Philosophie. Translated by Joachim Schulte. 
Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996, 22.
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the Christian God shows this perfectly when one considers that there is a 
divine revelation through Christ. But since Christ is truly human do we not 
encounter the same problem here? How can something or someone refer to 
something truly beyond or even be the reference itself? It but seems that the 
problem lies not in our understanding of the concept of a god, at least not in 
a religious sense for Christ is believed to be both God and man, but in abso-
lute concepts like transcendence or the beyond. A famous quote of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer says that “God is the beyond in the midst of our lives”5. In stat-
ing this he comes to the understanding that “God’s ‘beyond’ is not what is 
beyond our cognition [Erkenntnisvermögen]! Epistemological transcendence 
has nothing to do with God’s transcendence”6. Let us borrow this impulse 
to reconsider the concept of the beyond in a philosophical and ultimately 
in a theological way. As a hypothesis I will consider the Christian God to be 
truly God simply because of his complete absence; and furthermore I will 
show that absence is the one reasonable and meaningful depiction of divine 
transcendence.
For a start we need to look for the reason why there actually is a concept 
of the transcendent although something truly transcendent would be com-
pletely incomprehensible. When a concept is actually comprehensible there 
must be a condition of its possibility that makes its appearance plausible. 
Since we are discussing God’s beyond “in the midst of our lives” I will sug-
gest to investigate the epistemological and anthropological condition due to 
which the concept of transcendence may eventually make sense and occur. 
Thinking of the initial questions and statements presented one can clearly 
see that there exists a certain problem: in either way, whether one wants to 
see transcendence or transcending as a supporting concept for origination 
(like in the divine creation) or progression (of the human nature), it is always 
a mere abstract utensil for such and such purpose. In this manner it is but 
substantial in a hermeneutical sense, for such different concepts constitute 
or justify one’s understanding of the world.7 That on the one hand means 
they are intentionally installed. On the other hand this again means they 
subvert their own substantiality. Since we are searching for the condition 
of the possibility of transcendence we now must dismiss such an idea of 
substantiality, for it is indeed a derived one. It simply comes from ‘outside’8 
5 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Letters and Papers from Prison. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. Vol. 8 
(=DBWE 8). Edited by J. W. de Gruchy. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010, 367.
6 Ibid.
7 Cf. Nancy, Jean–Luc. The Creation of the World or Globalization. Translated by François 
Raffoul and David Pettigrew. Albany, NY: State University Press, 2007, 57ff.
8 Cf. Nancy, Jean–Luc. “Atheism and Monotheism.” In Dis–Enclosure: The Deconstruction 
of Christianity, by Jean–Luc Nancy, translated by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, and 
Michael B. Smith, 14–28. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2008.
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to support already existing concepts of the world, humanity and even God. 
It rather functions as a Deus ex machina or “stop–gap [Lückenbüßer]”9. So 
there must be another substantial (that is: underlying) cause for the idea of 
the beyond or transcendence. Gérard Granel for instance provides an ob-
vious but also intriguing point concerning what sub–stance truly means. 
“’That which stands beneath’ — literally the meaning of the term sub–stance 
— is, in effect, nothing other than the thetic profanation of the most banal 
of evidences, that of the presence of the real.”10 The “presence of the real”, 
as banal as it may be, is the very first assumption we have to assume and 
adopt to be able to consider the beyond. But simply stating that the assump-
tion of a certain presence generates that which is not present can hardly be 
a veritable thought. So let us have a closer look at what ‘presence’ actually 
means. “The word says it itself: prae–ens, pre(s)ent is that which ‘is there 
before’ — and before what if not me? And this ‘me’ is, consequently, already 
there, as absolute reference of the real that is present. But the inverse is 
likewise inevitable: a ‘real’ is already necessary in order that a me take[s] 
[sic!] place, present to itself among the things present. There is, here, a sort 
of bad schism [schize] or cleft, an original denial of the original affirma-
tion. In this way, the beginning begins only by beginning anew, or again: 
presence presents itself only representatively.”11 This means that the real 
always “disappears” though it actually is the condition of the possibility 
of the me that is required to represent (1) the real as the world it inhabits 
and (2) even the real that is indeed itself. Being a “me” that constitutes the 
“I think” that in Kantian terms must accompany any perception it makes12 
is but not enough to get to the core of the problem here. As Granel states it 
already takes a “real” that is “me” before I can even be aware of myself. It 
needs a present “me” for me to represent myself in what is simply called 
(self–)consciousness or self–awareness. There is actually no other way to 
handle the knowledge of oneself as long as we want to avoid the so called 
aporia of the self [Selbstbewusstseinsaporie] as prominently shown by Dieter 
Henrich and some of his successors. But in order to come closer towards 
the idea of the beyond the base for any sort of representation, that — as we 
just saw — is the “me” or “I”, should be our next subject to investigate. So 
let us dig deeper into the relation of the self [Selbstverhältnis]. As shown by 
Henrich one simply cannot comprehend the concept of the “I”, for referring 
9 DBWE 8, 381.
10 Granel, Gérard. Far From the Substance: Whither and to What Point? (Essay on the Ontologi-
cal Kenosis of Thought since Kant). Translated by Bettina Bergo, 1. http://www.gerardgranel.
com/txt_pdf/Tren–far_from_substance.pdf [25.11.2015]
11 Ibid., 2.
12 Cf. Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Werke in 10 Bänden. Edited by Wilhelm 
Weischedel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, §16.
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to oneself as “I” already presumes a real I that can never be understood as 
“me” or “myself” when in that way obtained via reflexive thought. “Because 
‘reflection’ can only mean that a knowledge already present is specifically 
seized and by that expressed.”13 This results in two conclusions: (1) Self–
consciousness cannot be the result of a reflection, for this would mean that 
the resulting I would be something different from the initial I, which means 
there will never be a chance of a coherent I=I; (2) the reflecting I must know 
the initial I to be absolutely identical with itself, so there must be an initial I 
before any reflection may even take place. So the search for this curious ini-
tial I is a mere petitio principii which is determined to be an empty percep-
tion.14 To conclude this step let us formulate this phenomenon in different 
terms. The initial I that is the condition of the possibility of an individual 
that can relate to itself and its environment is an inscrutable real beyond 
our comprehension. But what is it that is really obscured here? It is not the 
self–consciousness but rather a more existential point of connection or link 
to ourselves as what we are — humane? delivered? ephemeral? unique? But 
this is essentially the point. How might we ever be able to know who or what 
we — as a we or even an I — really are when every anthropological concept, 
whether it be scientific, cultural, or religious is a mere deduction. If the idea 
derived from one or several of these options it always comes hand in hand 
with its own abolishment for it brings with it the same contingency it ulti-
mately was born from. Henrich thus suggests another option. As long as the 
individual wants to illuminate its own being it needs, as a consequence, to 
transcend its thinking to a numinous cause (“Grund” or “Lebensgrund”) of 
itself as a self–aware being.15 Lebensgrund now can either mean the ‘base’ for 
one’s individual life or the ‘reason’ for one’s individual life — or rather path 
of life. As both ideas, merged together in this Lebensgrund, it brings us back 
to Granel’s concept of the substance. As we saw he states that the substance 
does actually mark the present, the real. We also realized that the present is 
strictly beyond our comprehension, for it is only grasped representatively. 
But what is grasped in this representation? It is the real not in any categori-
cal (that is as a first category of Relation in Kant’s Critique)16 or phenomeno-
logical sense but as something that is filled with meaning. This is what leads 
Granel to the reevaluation of the traditional concept of substance. For him 
13 Henrich, Dieter. “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht.” In Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Fest-
schrift für Wolfgang Cramer, edited by Dieter Henrich and Hans Wagner, 188–232, 193. 
Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966. Translation T.M.
14 Ibid., 195.
15 Cf. for instance Henrich, Dieter. “Subjektivität als Prinzip.” In Bewußtes Leben, by Dieter 
Henrich, 49–72, 64. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999, though the term is found throughout Hen-
rich‘s œuvre. 
16 Granel, Far From the Substance, 1.
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now substance “is a matter of the meaning of Being itself”17. I am aware of 
something or even of myself because this representation can make sense. We 
have to distinguish here though between basic non–intentional perception 
and an intentional ascription. A non–intentional perception of the things 
in the world for instance would be “’that with which’ … the painter finds 
himself confronted”18 — pure form without purpose or intention. But our 
awareness of the world does not stop there. We do not simply perceive the 
things in a categorical sense but rather discover them within a dense tangle 
of their relevance and meaning. For example: The perception of a brown 
cylinder with a rough texture, some smaller, thin cylinders emerging from 
its top, crowned with green excrescence is far away from recognizing a tree. 
But in knowing that this thing over there can provide wood for the campfire, 
wood that can float on water, wood one can carve into, wood to make tools 
with which one can craft furniture from wood again etc. makes the tree a 
tree for us in a meaningful way. This listing can go on and on and on forever. 
The substance, the meaning of Being itself — whether it be attributed to an 
inanimate object or a living entity — is found within our human lives that 
themselves are entangled in this clew of meaning.19
But what about the intentional ascription? What if meaning is not al-
lowed to develop itself in this ‘ensnarled’ way, but is simply installed? 
What if meaning would simply be ascribed as one sees fit, from ‘outside’, 
ex machina? For sure one would do no harm to the world when from now 
on one decides to call the tree ‘etre’ (‘ȇtre’?) for this would not extract the 
perceived thing from its (hi)stories and relations within the world. As it was 
put before, the meaning of the tree (of Being) is discovered within the clew 
of references. And now the Gretchenfrage. What about the self–conscious 
subject? Where does it need to start? It does not simply discover its own 
meaning let alone purpose. Sure, there is the possibility to label each human 
being in a biological, psychological, anthropological, geographical and what 
not sense to describe it representatively, but there is no chance in really get-
ting to know the meaning of one’s individuality.20 Not even the individual it-
self can manage to find this out. And now we are, again, back at considering 
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Granel himself in his text does not write out this whole hermeneutical ontology. To show 
this kind of hemeneutical ontology though Granel uses the term “that with which” from 
the above quote synonymously with Heidegger’s “Zeug” (Ibid., 4). Another analogy can be 
found in Wilhelm Schapp’s “Wozuding” (cf. Schapp, Wilhelm. In Geschichten verstrickt: 
Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004.) though Granel 
does not give any direct hint towards Schapp, since his works are only scarcely recog-
nized. Comparing those concepts would however be an interesting task.
20 For a critical discussion of representational and analytical concepts of self–consciousness and 
identity see Frank, Manfred. Ansichten der Subjektivität. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012 or Frank, 
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the crooked state of self–consciousness. To manage one’s contingency there 
now might actually arise the idea to simply ascribe a meaning to one’s life in 
an intentional way. Considering what Granel states about the representative 
character of the real and also considering Henrich’s point of self–conscious-
ness going astray when explaining itself from within this idea of an inten-
tional ascription seems to be a hopeless task when it comes to its existential 
worth. That means that clutching the numinous cause [Lebensgrund] cannot 
be intentional if it arises under the condition of subjectivity; otherwise it 
would simply be an excuse for an individual to live its life in such and such 
way it sees fit — a mere principle for viewing its world. As a philosophical 
concept the numinous cause might just drift off too easily in that direction. 
This is why Henrich avoids to speak of the numinous cause in a theological 
sense for it would be too easy to abuse the term for onto–theological con-
cepts of a represented substance from which then an absolute idea of hu-
manity and the world might be deduced. The idea of the numinous cause 
rather undermines the idea of absolute representation since it goes together 
with the preconditions subjectivity provides, and that is the impossibility of 
an apodictic judgment about the condition of humanity, the world or God. 
The “principle of subjectivity” Henrich speaks of relinquishes any idea of 
principiality [Prinzipialität] for itself as a principle cannot be an absolute 
principle or provide an absolute principle from which then absolute judg-
ments may derive. In this mode of thought it is impossible to install the 
numinous cause in one’s life intentionally to reassure a judgement already 
made. This would simply result in an analogue aporia as the self–conscious-
ness’s self–explanation. The idea would infinitely reassure itself. So there is 
no way for onto–theology to capture the numinous cause. But if we take the 
numinous cause to be God to that one individual in a subjective way like in a 
religious experience the idea of an intentional ascription cannot (righteous-
ly) occur; for faith — in religious terms — is a gift received and not a deci-
sion made. This means that the numinous cause cannot be seen in any way 
as a principle derived from this or that contingent (profane?) concept, but 
as a base and a reason for life that transcends human understanding though 
it has an existential impact on the life of the individual. Thus the numi-
nous cause, God, needs to be truly beyond the individuals comprehension 
as a self–conscious human being but still be there as a subject of meaning 
within its life. Only within the drastic contingency that is human life, at the 
boundaries of mere reason, the idea of a numinous cause that may be God to 
one can be taken seriously. Faith essentially arises against all odds or — as 
Manfred. Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität. Reflexionen über Subjekt, Person und Indi-
viduum aus Anlaß ihrer ‘postmodernen’ Toterklärung. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1986.
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Søren Kierkegaard once put it — “by the virtue of the absurd”21. Faith that 
forms itself within the realm of reason and knowledge would always arouse 
suspicion to be the accreditation of a preferred way of life that one ascribes 
to oneself in a literally mundane way. But this has nothing to do with faith 
or believe in God, for God’s “kingdom is not of this world” (John 18, 36) but 
“within” (Luke 17, 21) us.
This now leads to the final point. Sharing his thought with Kant, Jean–
Luc Nancy states that faith may take its place when knowledge is set aside.22 
Including the aspects discussed this means that the numinous cause, God, 
only makes sense for self–conscious individuals resulting in the assump-
tion that God himself is a product or “fruit of faith, which at the same time 
depends only on his grace”23. So within faith, as shown when consider-
ing Henrich’s idea, the individual discovers itself as set by God in the first 
place. This hermeneutical circle of understanding though cannot be broken 
by considering one of the two poles as the first one or even the principle. 
On the contrary: this assumption abandons any kind of principiality.24 This 
but means that there is neither a necessity nor an impossibility of God to be 
for one certain individual. Faith may either occur or it would be subverted 
by an immanent principle in the first place. Such a principle though would 
arise within the realm of reason and knowledge and act as a mere proxy of 
faith, a petitio principii. Nancy thus adds a radical assumption. If God is 
found beyond reason then faith is but “the firm fidelity of reason to its own 
atheology”25. This does not mean that faith is synonymous with the failure 
of reason but that faith is the “firmness with which reason confronts its 
own dissatisfaction”26. Henrich’s point concerning subjectivity shows this 
par excellence. The point where God might as well be absolutely necessary 
and/or impossible is where faith originates — and this point is only reached 
within human life, or more precisely within the conscious life of a self–
conscious subject. But the solitariness of the subject and the sudden need 
for a numinous cause lets one presuppose that God was not there before. 
21 Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Repetition, Kierkegaard’s Writings. Vol. 6. Edited 
and translated by Howard V. Hong. Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1983, passim.
22 Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XXX; also Nancy, Atheism and Monotheism, 25f.28.
23 Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” 26.
24 Nancy shows the abolishment of principiality brought by a represented substance or onto–
theological approaches by reconsidering the term of a creation ex nihilo that includes the 
radical idea of the devine kenosis. “In the first place, we might say that the nihil is posited. 
Perhaps this is the only way seriously to get out of nihilism. ‘Nihilism’ means, in effect: 
making a premise of nothing. But ex nihilo means: undoing any premise, including that of 
nothing. That means: to empty nothing [rien] (cf. rem, the thing) of any quality as princi-
ple. That is creation.” (Ibid., 24f.)
25 Ibid., 26.
26 Ibid.
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But the God that is not there is the God of onto–theology, the God that acts 
as represented substance. Against this concept of God stands the concept 
of God Nancy shows in Deconstruction of Christianity. “Christianity is by 
itself and in itself a deconstruction and a self–deconstruction. […] In other 
words, Christianity indicates, in the most active way — and the most ruin-
ous for itself, the most nihilist in certain regards — how monotheism shel-
ters within itself — better: more intimately within itself than itself, within 
or without itself — the principle of a world without God.”27 This means that 
the Christian monotheism does formulate an atheism since it turns itself 
against itself, that is against any onto–theological form of itself. Then again 
this “self–deconstruction” can only be achieved from “within” for the Chris-
tian monotheism is effectively an absentheism. The Christian God empties 
himself of his own divinity, and in this leaving the space for having faith in 
him without drifting off into the aporia of any immanent ascription of faith. 
In this sense monotheism and absentheism are formally indistinguishable. 
And it must be so to avoid drifting off into any thinking within the boundar-
ies of an ascribed or anyhow installed principle that claims its place blank-
ing out any other possible world–view. Reconsidering the child’s prayer one 
can find the problem of God as principle in an innocuous way but still as a 
functionalised idea. This means that the concept of God may also be at risk 
to be abused in ideological ways. God as represented substance too easily 
opens up a way to justify the idea that — in paraphrasing Jean–François 
Lyotard — could be called the ‘terror of the principle’. In short: the God of 
onto–theology has far less in common with the Christian God that revokes 
himself in the kenosis. Incarnating himself, becoming a contingent human 
being himself, this God became a God that knows what it means to be hu-
man.28 God’s absence can thus be seen as a part of his grace, for it truly 
enables an understanding of the world that is righteous in the face of the 
heterogeneity of the individuals and their experience of the world they live 
in. And where else if not within the lives lived by those individuals does 
God’s absence ultimately make sense?
27 Nancy, Jean–Luc. “A Deconstruction of Monotheism.” In Dis–Enclosure: The Deconstruc-
tion of Christianity, by Jean–Luc Nancy, translated by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, 
and Michael B. Smith, 29–41, 35. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2008.
28 Cf. Pohlmeyer, Markus. “Incursioni nella modernità: Dall’Esercizio del cristianesimo sug-
gestioni su un Cristo postmoderno.” Il Regno 4 (2014): 130–37.
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Abstract
 “GOD IS THE BEYOND IN THE MIDST OF OUR LIVES”
The article shows that the idea of a transcendent God that is considered to be 
beyond does only make sense in the realm of human lives. Based on Gérard 
Granel’s and Dieter Henrich’s concepts of the subject, it is shown that the con-
cept of the beyond needs to be discussed in a hermeneutical manner rather than 
a metaphysical. An idea for such a hermeneutical approach can be found in 
Jean–Luc Nancy’s Deconstruction of Christianity when Nancy specifies on his 
term “absentheism”.
KEY WORDS: absentheism, atheology, beyond, Lebensgrund, principle, self–aware-
ness, substance
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